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ABSTRACT
We study the positive and normative effects of counterfeiting, i.e.,
trademark infringement, in markets where consumers are not deceived by forgeries.
The fact that consumers are willing to pay more for counterfeits than for generic
merchandise of similar quality suggests that they value the prestige, or status,
associated with brand-name trademarks. Counterfeiters of status goods impose a
negative externality on consumers of genuine items, as fakes degrade the status
associated with a given label. But counterfeits allow consumers to unbundle the
status and quality attributes of the brand-name products, and alter the
competition among oligopolistic trademark owners. We analyze two policies
designed to combat counterfeiting: enforcement policy which increases the
likelihood of confiscation of illegal items, and the imposition of a tariff on
low-quality imports.
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Counterfeit products account for a growing fraction of world trade. The
U.S. International Trade Commission (1984) and Business Week (1985), among
others, have documented the extent of illegal copying of the labels and other
distinguishing trademarks of brand-name products. These copies, often produced
in semi-industrialized countries where labor costs are low and the enforcement of
trademark-protection laws is lax, find an all-too-willing market among some
discount retailers in the developed countries. Trade officials and legislators
in the United States, Japat, and Western Europe have reacted with growing concern
to the expansion of this illegal activity, and are seeking new ways to control
the phenomenon. These countries individually have taken measures to increase
sanctions against importers of counterfeit goods and are bringing pressures to
bear on the governments of the source countries. Collectively, the developed
countries have agreed to make the drafting of an anti-counterfeiting code one of
the priority agenda items for the proposed upcoming round of GATT negotiations.
Despite the evident concern of the business and policy communities about the
increasing incidence of foreign counterfeiting, the practice has attracted little
attention from economists. This is somewhat surprising, in view of the
interesting and insightful crime-theoretic analyses that have been developed of
such related phenomena as smuggling and illegal immigration.1 In this paper,
which complements earlier work reported in Grossman and Shapiro (1986), we
continue our efforts to understand the causes and consequences of counterfeit-
product trade and the efficacy of alternative policies that might be used to
control it.
1.See, for example, Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Pitt (1981), Martin and
Panagariya (1984) and Ethier (1986).-2-
For analytical purposes, we might regard the markets for counterfeit
products as being of two types. In one type of market, consumers cannot readily
observe the quality of the goods that they purchase, nor can they easily
distinguish copies from authentic merchandise. In these markets with
imperfectly-informed consumers, trademarks protect firms' investments in their
reputations, and counterfeiting represents an infringement on a firm's property
rights to its customers' goodwill. This practice, which we term deceptive
counterfeiting, was the subject of our earlier paper. In other markets, however,
consumers often know (or strongly suspect) when they are purchasing a
counterfeit. They distinguish fakes from legitimate, brand-name goods either by
close inspection, or because the legitimate producers can effectively signal
their authenticity by restricting and monitoring the distribution channels
through which their goods are sold. We investigate this type of non-deceptive
counterfeiting in the current paper.2
Why would a consumer knowingly purchase a counterfeit item? One possibility
is that the product offers good value for money in the light of its true quality
or usefulness. But this explanation raises the question of why the
counterfeiters would incur the risks associated with illegal copying, when in a
world of perfect information they could equally well compete for customers
lawfully.3 If the copies really were on a par with legitimate products but were
2. In practice, of course, it may not be so easy to characterize markets for
counterfeit products as being of one sort or the other. Consumers may differ
in their ability to distinguish fakes, so that the same counterfeit good may be
purchased unwittingly by some but intentionally by others.
3.Notice that we are drawing a distinction here between counterfeiting,
defined as the illegal copying of a brand-name label or other distinguishing
trademarks, and patent or copyright infringement, where the protected rights to
intellectual property are being violated. In instances of the latter
practices, the pirating firmwouldnot be able to compete for customers
lawfully, even though the copies may be equal in quality to the originals.-3-
offered at a lower price, then consumers would prefer these to the branded
merchandise. In fact, counterfeits generally are of much lower quality than the
authentic goods that they imitate (see U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Energy and Commerce, 1983). So the counterfeiters often compete instead in the
submarkets for low-quality goods. But there they suffer a cost disadvantage
relative to producers of generic products (i.e., those not associated with a
well-known manufacturer), who do not face the extra expenses associated with
mimicking the design and label of the brand-name goods and with any potential
penalties from being caught.
An alternative explanation is that the label and identifying design
characteristics (e.g., a logo, or a distinctive fabric pattern) are themselves of
value to consumers. Such is the case for status goods, i.e., those goods for
which the mere use or display of a particular branded product confers prestige on
their owners, apart from any utility deriving from their function. The
counterfeiting of status goods, then, deceives not the individual who purchases
the product, but rather the observer who sees the good being consumed and is duly
(but mistakenly) impressed.
The counterfeiting of status goods has a number of implications for the
functioning of these markets. First, counterfeiters unbundle the status and
quality aspects of the product, and thereby allow some consumers to purchase the
former who would not be willing to pay the high price of purchasing the two
together. Counterfeiters also dilute the market power of the producers of what
are, by definition, differentiated products. At the same time, the illegitimate
producers impose an externality on trademark holders by reducing the snob appeal
of their products. Legitimate firms are unable to offer their customers the
prestige associated with a small, select network of users, when a fringe of
imitators allows consumers with less discerning tastes to enter the club. These-4-
conflicting welfare effects of counterfeiting are the focus of the analysis that
follows.
In Section 2 we develop an equilibrium model of the market for a status
good, adopting for the purpose the demand structure first suggested by
Leibenstein (1950). We allow for the possibility of counterfeiting, and note the
conditions under which it will occur and the effects that it has on the market.
Section 3 contains our welfare analysis for the case of a fixed number of
domestic trademark owners. We study there the efficacy of two alternative
policies: enforcement and confiscation, and tariffs on low-quality goods. In
Section 4 we explore the case of free entry, thereby incorporating the effects of
counterfeiting on the number of status goods developed. Our findings are
summarized in a brief concluding section.
II. THEMODEL
We develop a relatively simple model that captures the main features of the
market for a status good such as wristwatches. Watches are available in
different qualities. Domestic firms produce high-quality goods and brand these
with their trademarks and other identifying, design characteristics. These
trademarks confer status on the owners of such items, which they value above and
beyond the inherent worth of the watches timepieces. For simplicity, we
assume that all high-quality watches of a given status level are perfect
substitutes.
Foreign-owned firms produce only low-quality watches. Some of these are
labeled honestly (including those that are marked, by agreement, with the label
of a domestic retailing outlet), and are exported to the domestic market as
generic products. Since these products would not be worn by those who value a-5—
fine watch, and since their manufacturers have not invested in the advertising
necessary to develop snob appeal, the generics offer no utility other than as
keepers of time. Other, less scrupulous, foreign firms manufacture look-alike
products that mimic the external attributes of the prestigious brands. These
low-quality imitations do not fool any buyers, who are assumed to be able to
judge quality on close inspection or infer it from the place of purchase.
However, the fakes do mislead the casual observer, so the owners of such watches
enjoy the status associated with the 'real thing".
Consumers differ in their taste for quality (and for prestige), perhaps due
to differences in their levels of income or wealth. We index domestic consumers
by y[O,NJ,where N is their total number. Each consumer has use for at most
one watch. Let L(y) and H(y) denote the "functional" utility that consumer y
derives from a watch of low and high quality, respectively. We define
V(y) 11(y) -L(y),and order consumers so that V'(y) <0(i.e., consumers with
low indexes value quality most highly).
If consumer y buys a high-quality, brand-name product, he enjoys, in
addition to H(y), an additional benefit, S(x,y), owing to the snob appeal of the
good. Here x measures the prestige associated with the particular brand. We
assume, following Leibenstein (1950), that the prestige of a given brand is
negatively related to the total number of consumers who sport its label.
The network of users of a particular branded item includes not only those
purchasing the genuine articles, but also those who buy copies of it. It follows
that the consumer with index y derives utility (gross of payment) of L(y) ÷
S(x,y) from the purchase of a counterfeit product. By appropriate definition of
we can take x simply to be the total number of sales of a given label
including the counterfeits. Then we have S <0,which captures the notion that-6—
imitations degrade the prestige of status goods.4 To the extent that status also
depends directly on the brand-specific market share of counterfeits, fakes would
degrade status even more sharply than in our model.
Our final assumption regarding demand is that S <0,i.e., that consumers
who value quality relatively little also place a lower value on prestige. This
could be because high-income consumers can better afford both quality and status,
or because true lovers of the product better appreciate its finer attributes,
from whence derives their snobbery. In any event, this assumption is not unlike
that commonly made in the literature on price discrimination, that individuals'
demand curves do not cross.
Turning to the supply side of the model, we assume that there are m
distinguishable trademarks, each owned by a different domestic firm. Until
Section 4, where we allow for entry and exit, we take inasfixed. Each domestic
firm (e.g., brand i) produces high-quality watches either at home or abroad
(whichever is efficient) at constant marginal cost c.It sells these goods at
price p., earning profits (gross of any development costs) of it.= (p.-c)z.,
where z. represents output for the domestic market.5
Low-quality, generic products are manufactured abroad (for reasons of
comparative advantage) at constant marginal cost a. Counterfeits also originate
outside the home borders, both for the standard trade-theoretic reasons and due
to the fact that enforcement of trademark-protection laws is less stringent
there. The unit cost of producing a counterfeit, b, is at least as high as that
4.We could permit prestige to increase initially with sales until some
threshold is reached. In our model, counterfeiting would always push sales
beyond this threshold, however, so there is no loss of generality in assuming
that S is monotonic in total sales.
5.Since we are assuming that status networks are location specific and that
marginal costs of production are constant, we may ignore any profits that the
firm makes on sales abroad.—7—
of producing a generic good, and may be higher if there are extra expenses
involved in making the copy resemble the name-brand good.
Counterfeiters must bear a second, additional expense (relative to their
more honest countrymen), which stems from the illegality of their activity. If
some of their illicit ware is discovered by their local government, by the
legitimate producers, or by the home government, penalties may be imposed.
To date, policing by local authorities in the source countries has been lax,
although there is some evidence of a recent shift in policy due to pressures from
the United States (see New York Times, March 30, 1986). In any event, we include
in b any penalties that might be imposed by the foreign government. Discovery of
counterfeits by the target firm sometimes elicits legal retribution. However,
affected firms report that this approach to the counterfeit problem generally has
not been fruitful, due to the fly-by-night nature of the culpable parties and the
6 fact that they usually lack attachable assets.For this reason, we assume that
the penalties that can be imposed by the trademark holder are negligible.
Finally, the home government may uncover some counterfeits via its enforcement
policy, either at the border (if the transformation into look-alike products has
been completed by then), or once the bogus goods reach the retail outlets.
Discovery by the home government often leads to confiscation. We assume that
this occurs with probability 4',whichwe treat as a policy variable reflecting
6.See, for example, the testimonies of Kenneth Umans and Richard A. Wallens
before the Subcommittee on Crime, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
the Judiciary (1985). Umans reports from his experience as a litigator on
behalf of plaintiffs in counterfeiting actions that "if a corporation is sued,
an injunction may stop that particular corporation from repeating its counter-
feiting transactions, but it doesn't cause a defendant to suffer financially.
Further, many defendants simply form new corporations to escape the strictures
of an injunctive order." (p.204)-8-
the resources that the government devotes to enforcement of its trademark
protection laws.7
We complete our description of the model with assumptions about market
structure and conduct. Free entry prevails among the foreign firms. This
ensures zero profits for producers of both low-quality watches and counterfeits.
Let q be the price of a counterfeit. (Low-quality imports sell for a.) Then we
have qb/(1-4), where we recognize that the unit cost of production, b, must
equal the expected revenue from a copy, q(1-), Home firms choose outputs, z1,
as in Cournot competition. Thus, our model has the structure of a Cournot
oligopoly facing a competitive fringe.
To understand the nature of equilibrium, it is instructive to begin with the
case of a single trademark owner (m1). This monopolist chooses its output to
maximize profits, recognizing that counterfeits and generics are available in
elastic supply.
Suppose, provisionally, that the monopolist finds it optimal to allow
counterfeiters to make positive sales. Then for any output level, z, the
monopolist will find his market among consumers with low indexes y, while
consumers with intermediate indexes will purchase counterfeits and those with
high indexes will opt for generics. Consumer z (the marginal sale for the
monopolist) must be indifferent between a genuine, high-quality watch and a
counterfeit. This indifference requires that the premium for high-quality
products over copies, p-q, be equal to the consumer's valuation of quality, V(z),
or
7.The exact form of the supply curve for counterfeits in our model depends
on whether the extra costs associated with mimicking the design and label of a
name-brand good (b-a) are borne before or after the risk of confiscation is
met. In the event of the latter, these costs are not incurred on confiscated
merchandise. To avoid becoming taxonomic in our analysis, we simply assume
here that the extra costs occur beforehand.-.9—
pV(z) +q
. (1)
Recall that x is the total sales of genuine and counterfeit branded items.
The consumer with index x therefore is the one who is indifferent between a
counterfeit watch and a generic one. The status appeal of the copy must just
compensate for its higher price, i.e.,
S(x,x) =q
-a . (2)
This equation alone gives the equilibrium network size, x, assuming that some
counterfeiting occurs.
Equation (1) gives the inverse demand curve facing the trademark owner,
provided that he chooses z <x.Greater levels of output deter entry by
counterfeiters, so that the marginal consumer for the monopolist then is the one
who is indifferent between his product and a generic. This gives H(z) ÷ S(z,z)
p =L(z)-a,or
p =V(z)+S(z,z)+a, for z >x*. (3)
We show these two sections of the inverse demand curve, and the corresponding
marginal revenue curve, in Figure 1.
The monopolist maximizes profit by setting marginal revenue equal to
marginal cost, as usual. This can occur on either segment of the demand curve,—10—
but for now we will stress the equilibria that result when counterfeiters are not
deterred.8 Then the firm's first order condition implies
V(z) +zV'(z) +q=c . (4)
In such a counterfeiting equilibrium the prestige offered by the monopolist, x,
is beyond its control. The firmcompetesfor customers with the counterfeiters,
who offer a similar level of status but lower quality products.
Finally, there might be a consumer (or perhaps several) who is indifferent
between purchasing a generic product and buying no watch at all. This consumer
has L(y) =a.We denote the total number who purchase a watch by w, with w <N.
We now are prepared to extend the analysis to oligopoly, with m >1.We
restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria among the m domestic firms.9 In
symmetric counterfeiting equilibria, all brands offer the same snob appeal, and,
as above, each firm recognizes that it cannot control the status of its own
product. Any effort by firm i to increase the snob appeal of its products will
simply call forth additional counterfeits of its label until the status of brand
i is equal to that of the others.
8.The necessary and sufficient condition for counterfeiting to occur is
c -q>V(x*)+x*V'(x*).We will return to consider limit-pricing equilibria,
in which entry by counterfeiters is deterred, when we discuss the welfare
implications of counterfeiting in Section 3B below.
9.As we shall see, a symmetric equilibrium always exists under the usual
convexity assumptions. We believe that asymmetric equilibria also exist for
some parameter values. In these asymmetric equilibria, highly prestigious
products are counterfeited, while less prestigious goods are not. We do know,
however, that asymmetric equilibria cannot exist when S(x,y) is independent of
y, i.e. ,whenall consumers value status equally.—11—
Some additional notation is helpful. Let x. be the total sales, including
copies, of watches bearing firmi'slabel. Define Zz. and XZx.. Finally,
let z and x denote per-firm variables in a symmetric equilibrium.
If Z consumers in total are to buy high-quality watches, then the premium
for quality must adjust so that
p =V(Z)÷ q . (1')
The consumer X (mx)is indifferent between purchasing one of the counterfeits,
each offering prestige x, and the generic product. Since each of these
alternatives provides the same low level of quality, the indifference condition
requires
S(x,mx) =q-a. (2')
The outcome of the Cournot competition among trademark owners is found as
usual. Each firm takes its rivals' outputs as given, and chooses z. to maximize
n.. Noting (1'), each faces a marginal revenue curve (in the range of positive
sales of counterfeits) given by V(Z) +z.V'(Z) +q.A symmetric
configuration has Z =mz,and hence the Nash-equilibrium condition is
V(mz) +zV'(mz)+q=c. (4')
Equations (1'), (2') and (4'), together with the condition for the total
number of consumers, w, describe the symmetric counterfeiting equilibrium.10 The
status of each brand is determined by (2'), and, as noted, lies outside the
10. Counterfeiting occurs under oligopoly if c-q >V(mx*)+x*V'(mx*),where
x satisfies S(x*,mx*) =q—a.-12-
control of the individual oligopolist. Outputs per firm are given by (4'), and
these determine the market-clearing premium for high-quality goods according to
(1'). Markups over marginal cost are limited here both by competition among the
branded items and by the presence of counterfeits. The heterogenous consumers
sort themselves according to taste, with those who value quality and status most
highly purchasing genuine, brand-name items and those who place the least value
on watches buying generics. Counterfeiters capture the consumers with
intermediate tastes.
III. WELFARE AKD POLICY ANALYS IS
A. Enforcement and Confiscation Policy
We now are ready to consider the welfare implications of counterfeiting, and
to study alternative policies that might be used by the home government to combat
this illegal practice. We begin by investigating the efficacy of enforcement
activity. We capture this policy by exogenously varying the fraction 4of
counterfeits that are detected and confiscated. Of course, there are costs
involved in devoting resources to inspection at the border and to the search for
counterfeits in the domestic marketplace. Here we focus only on the potential
benefits of more vigilant enforcement, since little information is available on
the functional relationship between government outlays and 4.
Weadopt as our welfare standard the unweighted sum of producers' surplus,
consumers' surplus and government revenue.11 Aggregate (operating) profits are
given by
11. We do not account for any welfare effects caused when third parties
mistake a counterfeit product for a genuine one.mt =(p-c)mz, (5)







Confiscation yields revenue for the government, if the illicit goods that are
seized by the government are sold at auction. Current U.S. policy gives the
enforcement agencies the option of whether to do so, or whether instead to
destroy this merchandise. In our model, it is optimal for the government to sell
whatever it confiscates.'3 However, it seems reasonable to assume that the
government would in fact destroy the counterfeits, if it were not possible for it
to remove the illegally copied markings and other design features that manifest
the violation of the trademark laws. Otherwise, the government would itself
become a purveyor of counterfeits. Here we assume that it is in fact costly to
obliterate the offending marks, so the government chooses to destroy any
counterfeits that it captures. (See Picture 1.) Of course, the welfare
evaluation of enforcement policy would be somewhat more favorable if the
government could easily transform confiscated items into generic products.
12. For ease of notation, we assume without further loss of generality that
the conuiner who is indifferent between purchasing a generic watch and none at
all is the one with the highest index among those buying generics; i.e., with
index w. In general, the last integral in (6) is taken over the set of
consumers of generic products, whatever their indexes happen to be.
13. This is not necessarily the case when deceptive counterfeiting is
involved, even if the government sells the goods that it confiscates as
accurately-labeled generics. See Grossman and Shapiro (1986).-14-
With government revenue equal to zero, aggregate welfare, W, is the sum of
the expressions in (5) and (6). Now, an increase in 4)simplytranslates into an
increase in q, the cost of delivering a counterfeit to the market.
Differentiating W with respect to q, we find
mx dW dx dz
{fS(x,y)dy} —+ (p-c) -m(x-z) . (7)
The first term on the right-hand side of (7) measures the change in status
enjoyed by consumers of brand-name and counterfeit products. The second term
captures the welfare effect of changes in high-quality output, in view of the
market power of the oligopolists that causes p to exceed c. The final term
identifies an unambiguous social cost of stricter enforcement with subsequent
destruction of the confiscated merchandise: confiscation raises the price of
counterfeits, q, above their marginal cost of production, b.In effect, the
perfectly competitive foreign producers must be compensated (on average) for
their efforts, whether or not their output reaches the consumer. Destruction of
some of this output implies a waste of foreign resources, the incidence of which
14
falls entirely on domestic consumers of counterfeits.
The dx/dq and dz/dq terms in (7) are computed from equations (2') and (4'),
respectively. It is easy to show that dx/dq <0:by raising the cost of
delivering a counterfeit to the market, tighter enforcement causes more consumers
to choose generics goods. This augments social welfare due to the negative
externality that these marginal consumers otherwise impose on the remaining
14. If b >a,some social cost of confiscation exists even when the seized
goods are relabeled and sold as generics. Then resources are wasted in
creating look-alikes that are not ultimately sold as such, and again domestic
consumers of counterfeits must pay for this waste.-15-
status—conscious owners of branded watches. Also, dz/dq >0(provided that the
initial oligopoly equilibrium is stable15), as more consumers select high-quality
watches over the now-more-expensive replicas. This effect too is welfare
improving, since it offsets an existing oligopoly distortion. However, it is not
possible to conclude that these two social benefits of stricter enforcement will,
in general, outweigh the negative effect noted above.
There are, however, fairly general conditions under which social welfare
rises with q (and hence 4) in a counterfeiting equilibrium. These (sufficient)
conditions ensure that the status gain experienced by consumers of high-quality
and counterfeit products exceed the social cost associated with the destruction
of the copies. Suppose that consumers who value status highly also value it
highly at the margin; i.e. >0.Suppose further that there are a large
number of consumers who value status nearly as much as does the marginal consumer
of counterfeits; i.e., S(x,mx) is small. Then absent any costs of enforcement,
an increase in the probability of confiscation must raise social welfare.(We
prove this statement in the appendix.) In particular, these conditions are met
if all consumers value status equally. Then, S(x,y) =0,and dW/dq =
(p-c)m(dz/dq)+m(x-z)>0.
B. Regime Comparisons
Our analysis of enforcement policy is useful for considering the welfare
implications of the feasibility of counterfeiting. The overall effect of illegal
copying on the efficiency properties of the market, for a status good can be found
15. From (4'), an increase in q caused by an increase in 4 is just like a
decrease in c, so far as the effect on Z is concerned. Seade (1985) and Dixit
(1986) demonstrate that a symmetric decrease in oligopolists' costs raises
industry output if the initial equilibrium is stable. In our model, the
stability condition is (m+1)V' (Z) +ZV"(Z)<0.-16-
by comparing the counterfeiting equilibrium described by (1'), (2') and (4') with
the equilibrium that would prevail if counterfeiting were not possible. The
latter equilibrium corresponds to a situation where 4= 1.
However, this regime comparison cannot be accomplished simply by integrating
up to q+ (1) the expression for dW/dq from (7). This is because (7)
applies only within the range of q that yield strictly positive sales of
counterfeits. For q large enough (closeto one), no counterfeiting occurs.
Yet, for a range of values of q, the threat of entry by counterfeiters still
affects the equilibrium outcome. In these limit-pricing equilibria, the
trademark holders are prevented from raising the prestige of their products by
reducing output, because doing so would make counterfeits attractive to some
marginal consumers. In terms of Figure 1, limit-pricing equilibria arise when
the oligopolist's marginal cost curve intersects its marginal revenue curve at
the discontinuity in the latter.
Once the cost of delivering a counterfeit is high enough so that legitimate
producers find it profitable to deter entry, further increases inhave rather
different effects than those described above for counterfeiting equilibria. In a
limit-pricing equilibrium, an increase in counterfeiters' costs allows the
trademark owners to cut their outputs to augment the prestige of their products,
while still avoiding being copied. Such declines in sales exacerbate the
oligopoly distortion, but ameliorate the consumption externality. Either of
these two effects may dominate. Thus, aggregate welfare may increase or decrease
as we raise $inthe range of limit-pricing equilibria.
In sum, we find that foreign counterfeiting of status goods has ambiguous
welfare implications for the importing economy. Total industry output of
authentic, brand-name products may be higher or lower in a counterfeiting
equilibrium than in the equilibrium that would obtain instead if copying were—17—
infeasible. Counterfeits do impose negative status externalities on owners of
prestige goods, but they also allow status appeal and quality to be unbundled, to
the benefit of other consumers.
C. Tariffs on Low-Quality Imports
In many industries, government enforcement policy has not been an effective
16 deterrent to counterfeiters. Often, the illegal markings are not added to the
counterfeits until after the goods have cleared customs in the importing country.
And it is difficult indeed for the enforcement agents to monitor the whereabouts
and condition of imported products once they have passed through the borders. In
other cases, the imported copies are branded with markings that simulate but do
not copy exactly the protected trademark of the legitimate producer, so that the
customs officials may lack the legal authority to seize the offending items. In
still other cases, look-alike products are smuggled into the country amidst
shipments of legitimate, generic goods. For these and other reasons, the
detection and confiscation rate for counterfeits of many items remains quite low.
As a result, industry lobbying groups such as the International Anti-
counterfeiting Coalition have sought alternative policies for combatting
counterfeit-product trade. One proposal that has found favor among some policy
makers is the erection of tariff barriers against imports from countries that are
known to harbor counterfeiters. A similar sentiment underlies the recent
amendment to the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act granting the President the authority
to deny tariff preferences to countries that tolerate trademark violations.
16.See, for example, the testimonies of William Ellis (President, National
Sales Audit), William Galloway (private investigator), Stanley J. Yavner
(attorney on behalf of Calvin Klein and Members Only) and Craig 0. Correll
(associate general counsel for Ocean Pacific Sunwear) before the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations, ThS. House of Representatives Committee on
Energy and Commerce (1984).—18—
While suchmeasures may be intended principally as threats to coerce foreign
governments to police their local manufacturers, it is worthwhile to ask what
implications tariffs would have for the efficiency of markets with traded
counterfeits. We turn to this question now.
We introduce into our model a specific tariff at rate t on all low-quality
imports. Implicitly we are assuming that the counterfeits enter the country
either without illegal markings or as part of a shipment of generic products, so
that they would be subject to the same tariff treatment as other low-quality
items. With the tariff in place, the domestic price of legitimate imports
becomes a+t, while counterfeits sell for q =(b+t)/(1-).The latter expression
incorporates the assumption that duty is paid on all counterfeits; the risk of
confiscation occurs only after the goods clear customs.
Aggregate welfare now includes revenue from the tariff, tm(x-z)/(1-) +
t(w—rnx),which is the sumofthe duties collected on counterfeits and on
legitimate, low—quality products. Differentiating the resulting expression for
W, we find
dW= S(x,y) dy} + (p-c)m + + (1-) -]. (8)
It is straightforward to show that dx/dt < 0, dz/dt > 0, and dw/dt < 0.
Intuitively, the tariff causes some consumers to substitute generic products for
fakes, because, to the extent that duty is collected on some counterfeits that
ultimately are confiscated, the prices of the copies rise by more than those of
the legitimate imports. The tariff increases the demand for high-quality goods,
which causes industry output to expand in a stable oligopoly equilibrium.
Finally, the higher cost of generic products induces some marginal consumers to
drop out of the market entirely.—19—
An increase in the tariff rate has three effects on social welfare. First,
it raises the status level of existing branded products (both legitimate and
counterfeit). Second, like confiscation policy, it offsets the existing
oligopoly distortion. Finally, the tariff introduces the usual consumption
distortion associated with a fall in the quantity of imports. Since this last
effect is small for tariff rates near zero, we conclude that a small tariff on
imports of low-quality goods always is welfare improving.
The primary benefit from a tariff in a market with counterfeit status goods
is not what one might expect. Although the tariff does restore some of the lost
prestige of brand-name goods, this effect is likely to be small in most
applications. Indeed, the status-enhancement effect vanishes as the probability
of confiscation approaches zero17. Rather, import protection is effective in
this instance because it is pro-competitive. The supply of high-quality products
increases as trademark owners respond to the upward shift in the supply curves of
their fringe competitors.
Finally, we note that a large tariff can be harmful here for the usual
reasons, and for some new ones. Any tariff causes w, the total number of
consumers of watches, to be too small. A large enough tariff also may push x to
a suboptimally low level, or z too high. Although counterfeiters always impose
negative externalities in our model, they also provide prestige to a range of
consumers who otherwise would not enjoy these benefits. Similarly, with
protection in place, some consumers purchase quality in order to buy status, when
these consumers would enjoy more surplus by selecting only the latter attribute
of the product under free trade. For t large, the social cost of distorting the
17. Note that [S(x,mx) +mS(x,mx)]dx/dt =/(1-),so 4O implies dx/dtO.-20-
margins for choosing counterfeits can outweigh the benefits from reducing their
number.
IV. Free Entry by Trademark Owners
So far we have taken the number of status goods, m, as given. This is
appropriate in the short run, and in the long run if there are significant
barriers to entry into the provision of status goods. If there are no such entry
barriers, however, then the long-run effect of foreign counterfeiting includes
its impact on domestic firms' incentives to develop new products, and hence on
the number of brands marketed.
In this section we explore the welfare consequences of stricter enforcement
efforts when the number of status goods adjusts endogeneously. In addition to
the effects identified earlier, we account here for the entry or exit of branded
products on account of improved protection of trademark owners' property rights,
i.e., an increase in 4.Inthe usual case (identified below), an increase in 4'
raisesthe profits of each status good manufacturer, thereby inducing entry of
additional brands. The presence of another brand reduces the sales and increases
the status of each product. Entry also erodes the market power enjoyed by each
trademark owner. But these social benefits must be weighed against the
additional fixed costs F that are incurred when a new brand is developed and
introduced into the market. As we shall see, the market may or may not be biased
towards too few brands, and thus the entry induced by more vigilant enforcement
may or may not constitute a welfare benefit.
In the free entry equilibrium, the number of firms, m, adjusts until
(p -c)z F, (5')-21-
i.e., until each firmearnszero economic profits. Equations (1'), (2'), (4'),
and (5') determine the variables z,x,p, and in.Sinceprofits are zero, welfare
is simply given by consumer surplus, (6). Differentiating (6) with respect to q
gives
dW= S(x,y)dy} -mz -m(x-z). (9)
Accounting for entry, there are three effects of increased enforcement
efforts, each captured by a term on the right-hand side of (9). First, the size
of each brand's network, x,changes. This affects the status enjoyed by
consumers of high-quality products and counterfeits. This effect is similar to
the first term in (7), but dxfdq is altered by the possibility of entry. Second,
the price paid for high-quality items changes. Any price decrease, for example,
redounds to the benefit of consumers.18 Finally, as in Section III above,
increased enforcement causes more counterfeits to be destroyed; consumers of
counterfeits must pay for this waste in the form of the higher price q.
To explore dW/dq more fully, we use equations (1') -(5')to compute
-E
(10 dq 2m-E'




18. In the case of a fixed number of brands, price effects dropped out of the
welfare expression, (7), because prices, p, were transfers from consumers to
home firms. With free entry, however, profits are zero, and increased prices
must be balanced against the benefits of the entry that they induce. These
benefits come in the form of enhanced status.-22-
din m(E -2)
(12) dqzV'(mz)[2in-E]
where we have defined E-ZV"(Z)/V'(Z), the elasticity of the slope of the
inverse demand curve for high-quality products. 2m -E>0is the second-order
condition for a firm's choice of z.
We focus here on the case in which an increase in counterfeiting costs, q,
raises the profits of trademark owners, thereby inducing entry. In other words,
we confine our attention to situations in which dm/dq >0.According to (12),
dm/dq is positive if and only if E <2.19In this case, greater protection for
trademarks does indeed promote the provision of status goods.
Whenever increased enforcement promotes the entry of new brands, it must
also raise the status of each product. From equation (11), dm/dq >0implies
that dx/dq <0,and the first term in our welfare expression, (9), is positive.
There are two reason why prestige is enhanced via stricter enforcement. First,
as q rises, marginal consumers (with index mx) substitute generic goods for
counterfeits. In addition, the entry of new products allows each brand to
generate more snob appeal as fewer consumers purchase authentic or counterfeit
versions of that brand; consumers can spread themselves among more brands,
enhancing the status of each.
Turning to the price effect, we see that prices fall in response to stricter
enforcement exactly when the demand curve for high-quality products is convex:
dp/dq <0if and only if V" >0.This weak condition is met, for example, by all
constant elasticity demand curves. So long as V" >0,increased protection for
19. E <2is the condition required to insure that a decrease in costs raises
oligopoly profits, as Seade (1985) shows. In our model, an increase in q has
exactly the same effect on the prdf its of trademark owners as does a decrease
in c. For a linear V(Z) function, E =0and dm/dq >0.-23-
trademark owners actually leads to a decrease in the price charged for their
products.
We now have provided rather weak conditions, succinctly described as
o <E<2,20which guarantee that increased enforcement both lowers the price of
high-quality products and enhances their prestige. Under these conditions, the
first two terms in (9) are positive. But the third term in (9), the term
capturing the wasted resources used in producing counterfeits that are to be
destroyed, is of course negative. It is not possible in general to compare the
two positive terms with this last term. Consequently, when we account for entry
of new status products, we cannot be sure that welfare is enhanced by increased
enforcement.
As in Section III, there are some simple conditions on tastes for status
that are sufficient to insure a positive welfare effect of an increase in 4.
Specifically,the conditions S>0and S(x,mx)0 again guarantee dW/dq >0,
irrespective of the form of V(Z).21 When all consumers value status equally,
i.e., S 0, increased enforcement efforts do indeed generate social benefits,
despite the waste that such efforts necessitate.
V. Conclusions
Counterfeit products are a significant and growing element in international
trade. In some circumstances, the profitability of counterfeiting requires that
unscrupulous producers be able to deceive consumers regarding the quality of
20. For example, if the function V() has constant elasticity, then E falls
between zero and two if the demand elasticity exceeds unity.
21. The proof of this claim runs along the same lines as the proof in the
appendix, after substituting for dx/dq and dp/dq from (10) and (11) into (9).-24-
their products. Yet many consumers who purchase counterfeits are well aware of
the fact that they are buying forgeries. In these instances, consumers'
willingness to pay premia for copies suggests that they value the prestige
associated with the look-alike of a name brand. These premia compensate
importers for bearing the risk of confiscation.
When consumers place a status value on name-brand merchandise, counterfeits
serve to unbundle the quality and prestige attributes of branded products. As
such, counterfeiting allows some consumers to enjoy the status of displaying a
prestigious label without paying for a high-quality product. Yet these
consumers impose a negative externality on other individuals who purchase
genuine merchandise, the status of which is degraded by the presence of
imitations. And the presence of forgeries alters the supply of legitimate,
high-quality merchandise by oligopolistic trademark owners.
In view of these disparate effects of counterfeiting, policies designed to
discourage foreign counterfeiting need not improve domestic welfare. One policy
response to counterfeiting is to impose a tariff on low-quality imports. Tariffs
do lower the volume of counterfeit-product trade. They also increase the supply
of high—quality merchandise, thereby correcting the distortion caused by the fact
that trademark owners have some market power. For these reasons, a small tariff
is certainly welfare-improving. But larger tariffs may discourage some consumers
from purchasing counterfeits, even when it is efficient for them to do so.
Much of our analysis is directed at enforcement policy, which we model
through the probability of confiscation for a given counterfeit product.
Generally, enhanced enforcement raises the status of brand-name goods (and of any
remaining counterfeits), and induces trademark owners to expand their supply of
high-quality products. But increased enforcement necessarily implies that more
counterfeits are imported for every one that reaches a final consumer. Given-25-
perfectly elastic foreign supplies of counterfeits, the costs of any counterfeits
that are produced and later destroyed must ultimately be borne by domestic
consumers. For this reason, it is not true in general that stricter enforcement
is welfare-improving, even when one ignores the direct costs associated with
policing activities. We do find, however, that domestic welfare rises with the
probability of confiscation when all consumers place an equal value on prestige.-26-
APPENDIX
Proposition: In a counterfeiting equilibrium, if S >0and S(x,mx) is small,
then an increase in the probability of confiscation, 4,raisessocial
welfare.
Proof: We rewrite the equation for dW/dq for convenience.
=U S(x,y)dy} +(p-c)
-m(x-z) (7)
The second term in (7) is unambiguously positive, since dz/dq >0.If >0,
then fS(x,y)dy<mxS(x,mx) and the sum of the first and third terms exceeds
dx
mx S(x,mx) j— -mx. (Al)
Now, by differentiating (2'), we find
dx 1
(A2) dq S(x,mx) +mS(xmxY
Substituting (A2) into the expression in (Al) yields
S(x,mx) _mS(xmx) 'S(x,mx)÷ mS(x,mx)
-mx=IflX S(x,mx)+mS(x,mx)].
(A3)
But S(x,mx) small implies that the right-hand side of (A3) is small as well, so
that dW/dq >0. Q.E.D.—27—
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Destruction of Counterfeit Products
Hundreds of counterfeit computers being crushed by a road-roller'